Lessons for New York: Comparative Urban Governance and the Challenge of Climate Change by McArdle, Andrea
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 42
Number 1 Comparative Urban Governance:
Citymaking In A Global Era
Article 4
April 2016
Lessons for New York: Comparative Urban
Governance and the Challenge of Climate Change
Andrea McArdle
City University of New York School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Disaster Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrea McArdle, Lessons for New York: Comparative Urban Governance and the Challenge of Climate Change, 42 Fordham Urb. L.J. 91
(2014).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol42/iss1/4
  91
LESSONS FOR NEW YORK: COMPARATIVE 
URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
Andrea McArdle* 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 91 
  I.  New York City and Weather Disaster: Addressing Climate 
Change in a Scheme of Vertical Governance .................................. 95 
  II.  Engaging Climate Change Through Transnational Urban 
Networks ............................................................................................ 102 
A. C40 Cities: Developing Metrics and Best Practices 
Among Large Cities .............................................................. 105 
B. Rockefeller Foundation Initiatives: Promoting Multi-
Sectoral Collaborations ........................................................ 109 
C. Resilient Cities ...................................................................... 111 
  III.  Horizontal Urban Governance: Transnational Networks as 
a Comparative Governance Scheme .............................................. 113 
  IV.  Addressing Possible Limitations .................................................. 119 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 121 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Climate change and the weather disasters to which it contributes 
are major challenges for urban governance.  The impact of 
Superstorm Sandy on New York City (the “City”), resulting in loss of 
life, substantial property damage, evacuation of critical health care 
facilities, flooded infrastructure, and an extended period of power 
outage, required an extensive response from the City.1  Using New 
York City’s experience with Superstorm Sandy as a launching point, 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. 
 1. See THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT–
DISASTER RECOVERY: PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A 1 (2013) [hereinafter N.Y.C. 
CDBG-DR PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/cdbg/
downloads/pdf/cdbg-dr_full.pdf. 
92 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
this Article addresses the fundamental question of urban governance 
that weather disasters present.  Recognizing the direct and immediate 
connection local government bears to coastal land, infrastructure, and 
the people who live and work within its borders, the role of a 
municipality in preparing for and responding to weather disasters is 
clear.  However, although the effects of extreme weather typically are 
experienced locally, the conditions that contribute to climate change 
are global in scope.  The enormity and complexity of weather-related 
disaster preparedness limit the capacity of any individual local 
government to cope with these phenomena. 
To consider the governance challenge in the context of weather 
disasters, Part I of this article contextualizes the question by providing 
an overview of New York City’s principal pre-Superstorm Sandy 
climate change mitigation measures under the administration of 
former Mayor Michael Bloomberg.  It then examines, in Sandy’s 
aftermath, the City’s commitment to a set of initiatives to develop 
capacity to withstand future weather events.2  It first considers the 
City’s set of initiatives in relation to the governance structure in the 
United States that serves as the source of authority, policy guidance, 
and fiscal support for confronting the challenges of climate change.  
The structure of governance encompasses multiple levels of 
government in a hierarchical, vertical relation, operating at 
successively “higher” territorial and jurisdictional scales in relation to 
a city.3  Thus, in the United States, we routinely think of a city’s 
climate-change initiatives within the larger context of federal and 
state government programs and policies, as well as regional 
governance schemes wherever they happen to exist, that address the 
impact of weather-related harms. 
The balance of this Article explores an alternative approach for 
addressing climate-change challenges that links urban governments 
horizontally, across national borders.4  Specifically, Part II introduces 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, 
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK 7 (2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/
report/report.shtml; Annie Karni, Bloomberg Lays Out Post-Sandy Strategy, CRAIN’S 
N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20121206/
REAL_ESTATE/121209942. 
 3. See NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE AND THE 
RESCALING OF STATEHOOD 8–11 (2004). 
 4. See infra notes 34, 56, 134, 147–48, and accompanying text addressing features 
of interurban cooperative networks, which sociologist Neil Brenner refers to as “new 
state spaces,” in the distinct context of urban locational policies driving capitalism in 
Western Europe.  These Western European networks nonetheless suggest models 
with respect to governance and scale that are useful in analyzing the potential of 
transnational networks for developing resilient strategies to address climate change. 
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the interurban networks, which are a set of arrangements bearing 
some family resemblances to other networks, both public and private, 
in the sense that they are information-driven and embrace 
collaborative approaches to problem solving.5  They operate within a 
normative framework established by international protocols.6  This 
Part focuses attention principally on the foundational assumptions 
grounding three networks of cities: the C40 Cities Climate Leadership 
Group, an organization of large cities in partnership with the World 
Bank, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives 
(ICLEI)—Local Governments for Sustainability, and a number of 
philanthropic organizations;7 Rockefeller Foundation-initiated 
resilience networks;8 and Resilient Cities, an annual global forum 
initiated in 2010 by ICLEI, the World Mayors Council on Climate 
Change, and the City of Bonn, Germany.9 
Part III discusses the concomitant possibilities for comparative 
urban governance of these transnationally connected cities.  This Part 
draws on the literature of network governance models that proliferate 
information in the service of flexibility, problem solving, and 
development of best practices, that typically involve devolution from 
the national to a local scale, and entail voluntary compliance with 
network-generated norms.10  It considers how these networks can 
offer a framework for comparative governance by serving as a 
continuing reference point on climate change, and a basis for 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary 
Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 22, 30–31 (2008), cited in Paul 
Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private Monitoring of Labor 
Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and Apparel 
Industry/CSC9000T, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 50 n.7 (2011); Richard B. Stewart, 
Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 448–49 
(2003); see also Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care 
Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139, 148–50 (2006). 
 6. See generally International Framework for Addressing Adaptation, 
ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/uccr/international-framework-addressing-
adaptation (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 7. See Our Partners & Funders, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/partners (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 8. See About the ACCCRN Network, ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/about-
acccrn (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 9. See About the Global Forum, RESILIENT CITIES, http://resilient-
cities.iclei.org/resilient-cities-hub-site/about-the-global-forum/ (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
 10. See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 5, at 30, 38–39; see also Trubek, supra note 5, 
at 148–50; Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 388, 396, 425–26 
(2004), cited in Harpur, supra note 5, at 50 n.4. 
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generating shared norms for developing resilience to climate-change 
effects. 
Specifically, Part III addresses ways in which interurban initiatives 
such as C40 Cities and Resilient Cities make cities more salient, by 
recognizing the crucial role that cities play both as contributors to 
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus global warming, and as loci of 
innovation, experimentation, and creativity.11  It develops the 
argument that these collaborative networks exemplify an alternative 
approach to governance in which cities are linked together 
horizontally to commit to innovation, promote policy diffusion 
through the exchange of ideas, expertise, and resources, and adopt 
best practices for climate-change mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Part IV takes up potential limitations upon the discussed 
conception of comparative governance.  The limitations include the 
enduring pro-growth orientation of cities, which may militate against 
city-led climate-related resilience strategies, referred to as “managed 
coastal retreat,”12 that entail scaling back waterfront development.  
Another consideration is that cities’ climate, geography, and economy 
will vary, and in any given instance a city’s experience may not be 
replicable in other contexts.13  This Part also takes up the concern that 
highly influential non-state actors engaged in international 
development or philanthropy may eclipse the role of local 
governments and reinforce paternalism vis-à-vis less resourced 
localities.14  To address the first concern, this Article refers to 
countervailing considerations of costs and incentives that could 
moderate the force of the urban growth imperative.  Responding to 
the second concern, the Article notes how networks can be formed in 
ways that emphasize commonalities among member cities.  It also 
addresses potential domination by powerful non-state actors with 
reference to the centrality of local governments’ participation in these 
networks. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See What is Urban Climate Change Resilience?, ACCCRN, 
http://www.acccrn.org/uccr/what-urban-climate-change-resilience (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
 12. See generally ANNE SIDERS, COLUMBIA CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, 
MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT 
AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS (2013), available at https://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Fellows/Managed
CoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf (analyzing managed retreat measures). 
 13. See CDP, PROTECTING OUR CAPITAL: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 
IN CITIES CREATES A RESILIENT PLACE FOR BUSINESS 17 (2014), available at 
https://www.cdp.net/CDPResults/CDP-global-cities-report-2014.pdf. 
 14. See Burris et al., supra note 5, at 19–21. 
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Noting the general benefits that cities can derive from a problem 
solving approach responsive to, but not limited by, individual cities’ 
experience and scale, this Article concludes that cities’ participation 
in transnational urban networks holds some promise from a 
comparative governance perspective. To the extent that these 
interurban networks can promote members’ voluntary participation 
in, and adherence to, developing norms and practices for addressing 
climate-related risks, they enhance transnational problem solving on 
an issue that is simultaneously local and global.  Further, they raise 
the possibility that local-level innovation of climate-related measures 
falling within the scope of local authority can jumpstart the stalled 
process of developing wider consensus on climate change that has 
eluded efforts of governments at the national scale. 
I.  NEW YORK CITY AND WEATHER DISASTER: ADDRESSING 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN A SCHEME OF VERTICAL GOVERNANCE 
This Part will consider the governance implications of the pressing 
climate- and weather-related challenges that a major U.S. coastal city 
such as New York faces.  The New York case study, despite its local 
context, is used to demonstrate how climate change, as well as the 
weather disasters to which it contributes, present urban governance 
challenges that are global in scope.  Recognizing the broad scope of 
the problem, this Article considers the benefits of a broader 
framework and a comparative approach, an approach this article 
refers to as horizontal urban governance. 
A municipality is the first line of defense in preparing for weather 
disasters, given the relationship a local government bears to land use, 
infrastructure, and public health and safety.  Drawing on the example 
of New York City, this Part examines the City’s recent engagement 
with climate-change risks and its embrace of resilience strategies15 
within the context of a vertical, hierarchically organized governance 
scheme for addressing extreme weather events.  Cities occupy a 
subordinate position within the hierarchical structure in relation to a 
state and national government; they operate within a single national 
frame rather than comparatively and transnationally. 
A critical geographic fact that New Yorkers themselves may lose 
sight of is that New York has 520 miles of waterfront.16  Superstorm 
Sandy, which struck New York City on the evening of October 29, 
2012, reached properties, residents, and infrastructure in the City’s 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2. 
 16. See N.Y.C. CDBG-DR PARTIAL ACTION PLAN A, supra note 1, at 3. 
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five boroughs beyond the Zone subject to an evacuation order, 
flooding many of the city’s subways and tunnels.  The storm’s toll 
included forty-three deaths and the total loss of approximately 300 
homes; left 800,000 New York residents and businesses without 
power; caused the evacuation of five hospitals and thirty residential 
facilities that sustained flooding damage and power failures; and 
placed 6800 persons forced to evacuate their homes in seventy-three 
city shelters.17  The storm’s impact on fuel terminals, pipelines, and 
fueling stations led to fuel shortages requiring rationing.18  It 
produced some 700,000 tons of refuse, extensive damage to 
boardwalk and waterfront structures, and the loss of more than two 
million cubic yards of sand from city beaches.19 
Property damage from Sandy included 402 buildings covering 
35,000 units owned by the New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA); more than 80,000 residents of NYCHA-owned high-rise 
buildings, including the elderly and infirm, were stranded without 
essential services following the flooding of basements in which 
heating and electrical systems were located;20 heat, hot water, and 
electric power were fully returned to all NYCHA buildings on 
November 18, nearly three weeks after the storm struck.21  Even a 
year later, reports persisted that storm-related leaks and mold growth 
in public housing units were not remedied.22  This sense of continuing 
vulnerability to the effects of weather-related risk is the kind of 
evidence that has contributed to the characterization of New York as 
“two cities,” differentiated by the extent to which its residents have 
access to resources.23 
                                                                                                                 
 17. LINDA I. GIBBS & CASWELL F. HOLLOWAY, NYC HURRICANE SANDY AFTER 
ACTION REPORT 8, 16, 18 (2013). 
 18. See id. at 21. 
 19. Id. at 18–23. 
 20. See FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, SANDY’S EFFECTS 
ON HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 4–5 (2013). 
 21. See GIBBS & HOLLOWAY, supra note 17, at 20. 
 22. See Mireya Navarro, Public Housing Residents Relying on Agency Still 
Recovering from Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/30/nyregion/public-housing-residents-relying-on-agency-still-recovering-
from-storm.html. 
 23. E.g., Ed Pilkington, De Blasio Vows Action on Inequality to Tackle New 
York’s ‘Tale of Two Cities’, GUARDIAN, Jan. 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jan/01/bill-de-blasio-mayor-inauguration-new-york; Sam Roberts, Poverty 
Rate Is Up in New York City, and Income Gap Is Wide, Census Data Show, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/nyregion/poverty-rate-in-
city-rises-to-21-2.html. 
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In the years before Sandy struck, the mayoral administration of 
Michael Bloomberg launched a number of initiatives that focused 
attention on climate risk.   In 2007, New York had introduced a 
sustainability blueprint, PlaNYC 2030, in which the City planned for 
population growth and targeted climate change as a significant 
challenge.24  Updated in 2011, PlaNYC committed the City to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the resilience of the 
City’s structures, communities, and natural systems, improving the 
City’s preparedness for extreme weather, and taking other steps to 
limit the harmful effects of climate change.25 
In 2008, with funding provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Mayor Bloomberg assembled the New York City Panel on Climate 
Change, which is an advisory body of climate science, legal, and risk 
management specialists designed to function similarly to the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change by providing projections 
and technical analysis of climate-change risks.26  The following year 
the panel reported as “extremely likely” a mean annual sea-level rise 
in New York of between two to five inches by the 2020s and a mean 
annual rise of between seven to twelve inches by the 2050s.27  In 2011 
the City produced a comprehensive waterfront plan,28 which included 
the goal of developing strategies for the City to improve its resilience 
to changing climates and rising sea levels.29  Concomitantly, the City 
identified specific projects, including strategic planning, data 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Sustainability, PLANYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/
theplan/the-plan.shtml (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 25. See PLANYC, CLIMATE CHANGE: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK 151 
(2011), available at http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/planyc_2011_
planyc_full_report.pdf. 
 26. See N.Y.C. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 3–4 
(2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2009], available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf.  In 2012, the City adopted 
legislation constituting the NPCC as a continuing entity with responsibilities linked, 
in part, to the release of the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. See N.Y.C. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK 
INFORMATION 2013: OBSERVATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE PROJECTIONS, AND MAPS 7 
(2013) [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013], available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/npcc_climate_risk_information_2
013_report.pdf. 
 27. See CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2009, supra note 26, at 3.  In June 2013, 
however, the Panel on Climate Change released a report revising and increasing its 
earlier projections of sea level rise. See CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013, supra note 
26. 
 28. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, VISION 2020: NEW YORK CITY 
COMPREHENSIVE WATERFRONT PLAN (2011), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/pdf/cwp/vision2020_nyc_cwp.pdf. 
 29. Id. at 105–13. 
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assessment, piloting physical measures to increase coastal resilience, 
zoning and building code changes, community-level planning, and 
emergency preparedness efforts.30 
The impact of Superstorm Sandy drew attention to the fact that 
even a well-resourced city that had become proactive in gathering 
data and planning for climate change was not fully prepared for the 
extent and effect of sea-level surges and inundation on coastal areas 
and the city’s infrastructure.  A road map of “coping strategies” that 
had in fact been suggested for the city and region in a 2011 study 
conducted at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia 
University seems, in retrospect, prescient: 
The uncertainty of the exact increment of risk due to sea level rise 
and global warming can therefore not serve as an excuse to avoid 
dealing with the region’s storm surge risk.  The coping strategies to 
be explored are likely to include a mixture of modern engineering 
solutions, regulatory measures, taxation and/or financial or 
insurance discounting, and—as the ultimate tool—innovative land 
use combined with buyouts and relocations.  Costs and benefits of 
these various options, including the mounting costs of not facing 
these issues at all, need to be addressed quantitatively in 
forthcoming studies.  They could not be resolved in this initial phase 
of assessment.  This assessment does however clearly show the 
magnitudes of problems that will need to be tackled.31 
In the aftermath of Sandy, the City established a Special Initiative 
on Rebuilding and Resiliency to pursue such strategies, and in June 
2013 issued A Stronger, More Resilient, New York, outlining over 
250 initiatives that seek to improve the City’s ability to withstand the 
effects of storm surges linked to sea-level rise.32  Also in 2013, the 
City’s Panel on Climate Change updated its 2009 sea-level rise 
projections.33 
In these post-disaster responses to weather-related risk, the City 
has acted within the larger context of federal and state government 
programs and policies instituted at “higher” territorial and 
                                                                                                                 
 30. Id. at 112–13. 
 31. KLAUS H. JACOB ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND A GLOBAL CITY: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE METROPOLITAN EAST COAST (MEC) REGION 4 (2011), available 
at http://metroeast_climate.ciesin.columbia.edu/reports/infrastructure.pdf. 
 32. N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2. 
 33. The Panel announced mid-range projections of between four and eight inches 
by the 2020s, with a high estimate of eleven inches, and by the 2050s, mid-range 
projections of between eleven and twenty-four inches, with a high estimate of thirty-
one inches. CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 2013, supra note 26, at 14–16. 
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jurisdictional scales in relation to the City.34  These include the New 
York State 2100 Commission’s preliminary report addressing ideas to 
improve the resilience of New York State’s infrastructure,35 and the 
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, chaired by former Secretary 
of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun Donovan, a nascent 
regional governance arrangement.36 
These levels of government have a role to play in shaping the City’s 
efforts both to mitigate and adapt to the impact of weather-related 
harms, by (1) providing financial assistance, technical expertise, and 
crucial data, (2) approving City proposals that are linked to that 
assistance, and (3) serving as a source of policy guidance.  For 
example, the City received $1,772,820,000 under the federal 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s first distribution 
of Community Development Block Grant-Disaster Relief (CDBG-
DR) funds.37  The City was required to (and did) obtain approval 
from the federal government for its plans to use these funds for 
housing, business recovery, infrastructure, and resilience 
investments.38  In addition to this allocation of CDBG monies, the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. BRENNER, supra note 3, at 8–11; see also Jacob Alderdice, Impeding Local 
Laboratories: Obstacles to Urban Policy Diffusion in Local Government Law, 7 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 463–65 (2013) (noting the limits on local governments’ 
powers to effectuate policy innovation inhering in the varying scope of local home 
rule powers and authority among states to preempt local action); Richard C. 
Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local 
Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2556, 2563–64 (2006) (arguing 
that in the United States local governments are “subservient” to federal and state 
governments in the vertical structure created under federalism, which restricts the 
efforts of cities to achieve public policy goals). But see Richard Briffault, Home Rule 
and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1 (2006) (pointing to successful 
examples of local legislation concerning government structures and electoral 
procedures, and arguing that these measures can serve as local “laboratories” for 
policy developments that are potentially national in scope). 
 35. NYS 2100 COMMISSION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE STRENGTH AND 
RESILIENCE OF THE EMPIRE STATE’S INFRASTRUCTURE 139 (2013), available at 
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/documents/NYS2100.pdf. 
 36. HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, HURRICANE SANDY 
REBUILDING STRATEGY: STRONGER COMMUNITIES, A RESILIENT REGION 36–37 
(2013), available at portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?
id=hsrebuildingstrategy.pdf (recommending regional coordination of infrastructure 
planning and strengthening). See generally id. at 49–83. 
 37. Mireya Navarro, City to Begin Distributing Storm Aid This Summer, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/nyregion/city-plans-to-
dispense-nearly-2-billion-in-hurricane-aid-starting-this-summer.html?_r=0.  The City 
allocated $1.77 billion for Hurricane Sandy recovery, including $648 million for 
housing programs, $293 million for business programs, $360 million for infrastructure 
and other City services, and $294 million in resilience investments. Id. 
 38. See N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2, 
at 402. 
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City has had access to other federal funding, including grants from the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Small Business 
Administration Disaster Loans, and National Flood Insurance 
Program disbursements.  However, with the funding comes the 
necessity to follow federal program mandates and procedures.39 
Similarly, when the City issued A Stronger, More Resilient New 
York, it enumerated the federal and state agencies with which it 
would be required to cooperate to receive funding, technical and 
logistical support, and authority to achieve certain reforms.40  For 
example, the City needs assistance and funding from the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to implement various beach renourishment and 
floodgate repair projects,41 review by FEMA of flood-related building 
standards, FEMA’s allowance of mitigation credits for flood 
insurance policyholders who undertake resilience improvements and 
other changes in residential insurance policy features, and FEMA’s 
authorization of a more flexible building classification in the National 
Flood Insurance Program.42  To secure changes in price gouging laws 
and laws regulating gasoline supply contracts, the City must call on 
New York State to adopt legislation,43 reflecting limits on its home 
rule authority.44 
The City is also subject to planning and funding within a regional 
context.  In August 2013 the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 
chaired by then HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan, issued its report, 
                                                                                                                 
 39. E.g., Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy 
at the Grassroots: Prioritizing the Effects of the Fiscal Crisis in New York at the 
Local Government Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 735–39 (2012) (discussing 
fiscal federalism and the impact on local governments of decreasing levels of federal 
aid). 
 40. N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2, at 
416–34. 
 41. Id. at 417–18. 
 42. Id. at 420–21.  The City is also limited in any effort to craft resiliency strategies 
applicable to privately-owned multifamily residential buildings that are subject to the 
requirements of state-administered rent stabilization laws, NYU FURMAN CTR., THE 
PRICE OF RESILIENCE: CAN MULTIFAMILY HOUSING AFFORD TO ADAPT? 37–39 
(2014), http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_ThePriceofResilience_
July2014.pdf, or to federal and state laws governing buildings subject to affordable 
housing subsidies. Id. at 39–41. 
 43. N.Y.C. SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON REBUILDING & RESILIENCY, supra note 2, at 
423. 
 44. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (conferring home rule powers of local 
governments); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2014) (authorizing local 
governments to adopt laws in relation to their property, affairs, or government, in 
addition to other enumerated powers).  For a discussion of the origins and 
permutations of home rule doctrine, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1—
The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–18 (1990). 
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Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, A 
Resilient Region,45 promoting regional coordination to infrastructure 
development46 and strategies for enhancing the ability of state and 
local governments to develop long-term approaches to recovery and 
resilience following the storm.47 
In sum, notwithstanding its initiatives in climate-change planning 
and goal setting, as a municipality in a federal system New York does 
not operate completely autonomously in responding to weather 
disaster or in developing climate-change resilience strategies.  Rather, 
the formal legal structure of local governments in the United States, 
vis-à-vis states and the federal government, positions a city as 
subordinate to governments that subsume it territorially, 
jurisdictionally, and politically; cities responding to disasters engage 
federal and state agencies for aid without any presumption of 
leverage or entitlement.48  Referring to this structure, Richard 
Schragger has observed that “cities and their leaders are three levels 
down the political food chain and must normally ask the states for 
whatever powers they have or wish to exercise.”49 
Schragger argues that the constraints on cities inhere in the formal 
separation of federal, state, and local government authority, which 
can limit a local government’s ability to shape policy.50  These 
constraints also implicate the “vertical competition” among federal, 
state, and local officials for recognition and loyalty among local 
constituents, where the interests among these governmental 
representatives are not necessarily congruent.51  Certainly, as Richard 
Briffault has observed, the actual scope of local authority is variable 
and difficult to assess, “reflecting an ever-shifting mix of state 
delegation and oversight, the vagaries of judicial interpretation, 
fluctuations in the local capacity to initiate measures, the strains of 
interlocal conflict and the changing economic, social and 
technological dimensions of the problems local governments are 
                                                                                                                 
 45. HURRICANE SANDY REBUILDING TASK FORCE, supra note 36. 
 46. See id. at 49–83. 
 47. Id. at 129–41. 
 48. Schragger, supra note 34, at 2562 (discussing difficulties encountered by New 
Orleans’ Mayor Nagin after Hurricane Katrina in securing aid from higher levels of 
government); see also Salkin & Gottlieb, supra note 39, at 735–55 (examining the 
impact on local governments of decreasing or fluctuating levels of federal and state 
aid and, in the specific context of New York, the effect of state-imposed restrictions 
on taxation and unfunded mandates). 
 49. Schragger, supra note 34, at 2545–46. 
 50. Id. at 2562–64. 
 51. Id. at 2564–68. 
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called upon to address.”52  Thus, the picture is complicated, and even 
recognizing the authority that cities generally wield with respect to 
land use,53 the issues and impacts resulting from climate change-
induced weather disaster typically have externalities that may cause 
them to be understood as multijurisdictional. 
However, other governance possibilities exist and, in fact, at the 
same time that New York City has acted, and at times has been 
constrained, within a vertical governance scheme, it has also played 
an active role in the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,54 an 
alternative modality to address climate-change challenges 
highlighting the role of cities as generators of policies and practices 
that can spread and gain adherents among other cities.55  The next 
section examines in greater detail the attributes of C40 Cities and 
related interurban networks, which position urban governments 
horizontally rather than vertically, linking cities in networks across 
national borders.56 
II.  ENGAGING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL 
URBAN NETWORKS 
Scholars of alternative governance models emphasize that 
contemporary conditions of “complexity, diversity, and particularity” 
are not well served by a centralized, “one size fits all” approach to 
problem solving; rather, these conditions call for a process that can 
adapt to changing circumstances and call upon multiple participants 
from the public and private sectors. 57  It is under these conditions that 
the concept of the network has emerged as a “metaphor” to convey 
the idea of a system of “distributed governance” functioning under a 
variety of arrangements.58  Networks are “polycentric” and typically 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Briffault, supra note 44, at 18. 
 53. Id. at 57–59.  For a recent ruling by the New York Court of Appeals affirming 
“the preeminent power of a locality to regulate land use,” see Cooperstown Holstein 
Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, No. 130 (N.Y. 2014), available at 
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2014/Jun14/Jun14.htm (holding that towns 
may prohibit hydrofracking within the borders of a municipality through local zoning 
laws because state legislation did not preempt municipalities’ home rule authority to 
regulate land use). 
 54. About C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/about (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 55. E.g., Bus Rapid Transit: Transportation Initiative, C40 CITIES, 
http://www.c40.org/networks/bus_rapid_transit (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (describing 
how the C40 Bus Rapid Transit Network promotes sharing of knowledge and 
spreading of energy-efficient bus rapid transit across cities). 
 56. See BRENNER, supra note 3, at 286–94. 
 57. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 4–6; Stewart, supra note 5, at 448–52. 
 58. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 12–13. 
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“regulate” through the use of “soft” law,59 setting goals and targets, 
aggregating data related to outcomes, and sharing information.60  
They operate at all levels of government as well as in the private 
sector.61 
Networks in the transgovernmental context have been described as 
“fast, flexible, and decentralized,” benefiting from the absence of a 
formal bureaucratic structure,62 even as others raise concerns of a 
“technocratic conspiracy.”63  International law scholar Anne-Marie 
Slaughter has identified categories of transgovernmental networks 
that have arisen among national-level officials.64  By contrast, the 
resilience networks under consideration here comprise local 
government officials pursuing strategies to mitigate or adapt to 
climate change, although they operate within a framework established 
by international protocols, including the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change and the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.65  The recent appointment of former New York City 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg as U.N. Special Envoy for Climate 
Change and Cities66 suggests networked cities’ increasingly visible 
role in global strategies to combat climate change.  Bloomberg, who 
also serves as President of the Board of Directors of the C40 Cities 
for Climate Change network, was named to this new post specifically 
to assist the U.N. Secretary-General in engaging cities to muster the 
political wherewithal needed to undertake climate-change measures 
and to offer ideas and strategies to the U.N Climate Summit in New 
York on September 23, 2014.67 
The salience of cities operating in a global context as loci for 
developing increased resilience to climate change is further 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 4, 30, 38–39 (discussing characteristics of networks in relation 
to more traditional state-centered, command–and-control modes of governance); 
Trubek, supra note 5, at 149–50 (noting how soft law entails greater procedural 
informality, interaction among a range of actors, “learning and feedback” through 
cooperative exchange of information, and the building of consensus). 
 60. Trubek, supra note 5, at 148–49. 
 61. Lobel, supra note 10, at 375–76. 
 62. Id. (quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government 
Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347 (2001)). 
 63. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 347–48 (2001). 
 64. Id. at 355–59. 
 65. International Framework for Addressing Adaptation, supra note 6. 
 66. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Appoints Michael 
Bloomberg of United States Special Envoy for Cities and Climate Change (Jan. 31, 
2014), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sga1453.doc.htm. 
 67. Id. 
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highlighted by the recent formation of the Medellin Collaboration on 
Urban Resilience at the conclusion of the Seventh World Urban 
Forum.68  The Forum, in turn, was organized by the UN Habitat for a 
Better Urban Future, the Programme for Human Settlements, which 
takes a global approach to sustainable urbanism.69  The collaboration 
comprises the UN-Habitat, the United Nations Office for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR), the World Bank Group, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, C40 Cities, ICLEI, 100 Resilient Cities, the Inter-
American Development Bank, and the Global Facility for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Recovery.  All of these groups are transnational 
in scope and have as their focus the city as a jurisdictional, population 
settlement, or economic unit.70  With its emphasis on resilience, the 
collaboration seeks to assist cities to address the effects of climate 
change and respond to disaster risks.  It does so chiefly by 
coordinating and reconciling cities’ approaches to improving 
resilience; increasing cities’ access to financing that could help protect 
against vulnerability; promoting sharing of best practices among 
cities; and encouraging coordinated action with urban networks.71  A 
number of these priorities are part of the collaborations that are a 
focus of analysis in this Part. 
Specifically, this Part will consider the foundational assumptions 
underpinning: (1) the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, the 
World Bank, ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability, and a 
number of philanthropic organizations;72 (2) resilience initiatives 
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation;73 and (3) Resilient Cities, 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Jonathan Andrews, New Global Collaboration for Urban Resilience 
Announced, CITIES TODAY (Apr. 11, 2014), http://cities-today.com/2014/04/new-
global-collaboration-urban-resilience-announced/#more-4940.  The World Urban 
Forum hosts a biennial conference drawing attendees from national, state, and local 
governments, non-governmental and community-based organizations, the private 
sector, United Nations organizations, and various funders and development-fostering 
bodies.  It focuses on issues related to the implications of accelerated growth of cities 
worldwide. WORLD URB. F., http://wuf7.unhabitat.org/theworldurbanforum (last 
visited June 12, 2014). 
 69. UN-HABITAT BETTER URB. FUTURE, http://unhabitat.org (last visited June 12, 
2014).  The program focuses on seven areas of urban study: urban legislation, land, 
and governance; urban planning and design; urban economy; urban basic services; 
housing and slum upgrading; risk reduction and rehabilitation; and urban research 
and capacity. Id.  Among its activities are the cities and climate change initiative and 
the city resilience profiling program. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Our Partners & Funders, supra note 7. 
 73. See, e.g., About the ACCCRN Network, supra note 8. 
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an annual global forum initiated in 2010 by ICLEI, the World Mayors 
Council on Climate Change, and the City of Bonn, Germany.74 
A. C40 Cities: Developing Metrics and Best Practices Among 
Large Cities 
Founded in 2005 by the former Mayor of London, the C40 Cities 
Climate Leadership Group is a network of the world’s largest cities 
that seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to take other 
actions to decrease climate-related risk.75  That cities are gaining 
greater prominence in the campaigns to reduce climate risk is based 
on their substantial consumption of energy and production of 
greenhouse gas emissions, the expansion of urbanized areas globally, 
and the high percentage of cities located in coastal areas subject to 
flooding as a result of sea-level rise.76 Working in conjunction with its 
partners77 and funder organizations,78 the Climate Leadership Group 
organizes networks of cities based on shared interests into seven 
broad “initiative areas”: adaptation and water; energy; finance and 
economic development; measurement and planning; solid waste 
management; sustainable communities; and transportation.79  An 
illustrative adaptation and water initiative links to a network of delta 
                                                                                                                 
 74. About the Global Forum, supra note 9. 
 75. C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/about (last visited July 10, 2014). 
 76. Why Cities? Ending Climate Change Begins in the City, C40 CITIES, 
http://c40.org/ending-climate-change-begins-in-the-city (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 77. In addition to the Clinton Climate Initiative, partners include Arup, an 
interdisciplinary professional services group that has assisted with workshops on 
carbon reduction and producing reports documenting the work of C40 mayors; 
ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability to help develop a broadly applicable 
standard for tabulating and reporting greenhouse gas emissions; World Resources 
Institute, to work with ICLEI on an instrument for measuring city-level emissions; 
CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) to assist in collecting and reporting 
data on cities’ greenhouse gas emissions; the World Bank, to institute a metric to 
facilitate cities’ measuring and reporting emissions and demonstrating progress in 
qualifying for financial assistance for major projects; Siemens, a corporation engaged 
in energy, healthcare, financial, and technology sectors that has helped institute a city 
climate leadership competition. See Our Partners & Funders, supra note 7. 
 78. Funders include Bloomberg Philanthropies, Children’s Investment Fund 
Foundation, an organization working to support children’s welfare in developing 
nations; Realdania, a philanthropic group derived from a former mortgage credit 
organization that focuses on built resources; and Siemens, also a partner providing 
various kinds of support for cities’ capacity to measure their climate initiatives. See 
Our Partners & Funders, supra note 7. 
 79. Networks: Connecting Cities on Topics of Common Interest, C40 CITIES, 
http://www.c40.org/networks (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
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cities to enable these cities to share learning on climate adaptation.80  
The sustainable urban development network led by the city of 
Melbourne is undertaking an initiative that encompasses three 
strategic projects—intervention and policy mapping, benchmarking 
and goal setting, and collaborative resourcing—all of which are 
designed to lead toward the establishment of green cities.81  This 
group in particular signaled its intent to work with the private sector 
to produce large infrastructure projects.82  C40 Cities also provides 
direct assistance to cities, such as dedicated staffing and other 
resources.83  The projects supported by C40 Cities are informed by 
the consortium’s animating belief that, in the absence of clear 
indications that intergovernmental initiatives at higher scales have 
been effective, cities can drive efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and improve resilience against the effects of climate 
change.84  With particular relevance to governance considerations, the 
assumption behind C40 Cities is that mayors have clear accountability 
to those who live and work in the cities they lead and that city-level 
governments are better able to respond flexibly to changing needs 
and circumstances to effectuate climate-change mitigation and 
adaptation.85  To substantiate that insight, C40 Cities collected survey 
data in 2011 and again in 2013 to document mayoral powers and 
trends in climate actions at the city level.  As former New York City 
Mayor and current President of the C40 Board of Directors Michael 
Bloomberg wrote in the Foreword to the 2013 survey report, cities 
have the “power, the expertise, the political will and the 
resourcefulness to continue to take meaningful climate action, and 
are more than ever before, at the forefront of the issue of climate 
change as leaders, innovators and practitioners.”86  Survey data 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Connecting Delta Cities: Adaptation and Water Initiative, C40 CITIES, 
http://www.c40.org/networks/connecting_delta_cities (last visited July 10, 2014). 
 81. Sustainable Urban Development: Sustainable Communities Initiative, C40 
CITIES, http://www.c40.org/networks/Sustainable_Urban_Development (last visited 
July 10, 2014). 
 82. Melbourne to Lead Global Network of Cities on Sustainable Urban 
Development, CITY MELBOURNE (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.melbourne.
vic.gov.au/AboutCouncil/MediaReleases/Pages/MelbournetoleadGlobalNetworkofCi
tieson.aspx. 
 83. Networks: Connecting Cities on Topics of Common Interest, supra note 79. 
 84. ARUP & C40 CITIES, CLIMATE ACTION IN MEGACITIES: C40 CITIES BASELINE 
AND OPPORTUNITIES VOLUME 2.0 5 (2014), available at http://issuu.com/
c40cities/docs/c40_climate_action_in_megacities/3?e=10643095/6541335. 
 85. Why Cities? Ending Climate Change Begins in the City, supra note 76. 
 86. Michael R. Bloomberg, Foreword to ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 3.  
For example, survey data indicate that mayors have the largest degree of authority 
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indicate that cities have the capacity to lead by setting broad policy 
priorities and shifts that set the stage for climate actions across other 
sectors, including transportation, energy, waste, and finance.87 
The network operates in large part through supporting the 
production and dissemination of information by and for the benefit of 
its members, and thus substantiates the emphasis in the scholarship of 
networks on the role of information as an instrument of governance.88  
C40 Cities’ research and communications infrastructure for 
disseminating new knowledge and strategies is illustrative.89  The 
network conducts ongoing research, and recently embarked on a 
project to study ways in which actions taken by cities can help achieve 
the global commitment to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial measurements.90  The group also produces case 
studies documenting the efforts of individual cities.91  C40 Cities 
sponsors workshops on specific topics including bus rapid transit, 
green growth, solid waste management92 and other programming to 
facilitate peer exchanges in which similarly situated cities can share 
information and their experience with energy efficiency practices and 
                                                                                                                 
over the Buildings, Water, and Community-scale Development sectors in the climate 
change arena. ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 18. 
 87. ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 17–18. 
 88. See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 5; Trubek, supra note 5; Slaughter, supra 
note 63, at 363–64 (noting the view that information distribution supplants more 
coercive measures for achieving “policy convergence”). 
 89. See generally C40 Research, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/research (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 90. See Research Spotlight: Demonstrating City Impact on National Emissions 
Reduction Targets, C40 BLOG (May 14, 2014), http://www.c40.org/blog_posts/
research-spotlight-kerem-yilmaz-c40-director-of-research-projects. 
 91. See Case Studies, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/case_studies (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2014).  Examples include programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
improve energy efficiency in Seoul, Eco-mileage: A Citizen’s Participation 
Programme for Protecting the Environment, C40 CITIES (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.c40.org/case_studies/eco-mileage-a-citizen-s-participation-programme-
for-protecting-the-environment, lessen vulnerability to flooding from sea level rise 
and high tides through a system of moveable barriers in Venice, The Mose System to 
Safeguard Venice from Flooding, C40 CITIES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.c40.org/
case_studies/the-mose-system-to-safeguard-venice-from-flooding, reduce carbon 
dioxide levels in transportation, Venice Integrated Mobility Plan, C40 CITIES (Apr. 
17, 2014), http://www.c40.org/case_studies/venice-integrated-mobility-plan, and use 
alternate energy sources in Boston, Renew Boston, C40 CITIES (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.c40.org/case_studies/renew-boston. 
 92. See 2nd C40 Green Growth Network Workshop, C40 CITIES, 
http://c40.org/events/2nd-c40-green-growth-network-workshop (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014) (green growth); C40 Bus Rapid Transit Workshop, C40 CITIES, http://c40.org/
events/c40-bus-rapid-transit-workshop (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (bus rapid transit); 
Solid Waste Networks Workshop, C40 CITIES, http://c40.org/events/solid-waste-
networks-workshop (last visited Aug. 4, 2014) (solid waste management). 
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greenhouse gas emissions.93  The network points to 2013 survey data 
documenting increases in cycle share programs, rising use of LED 
street lighting, and increasing adoption of bus rapid transit programs 
that accommodate large numbers of passengers (spreading from 
South American cities increasingly to more developed northern 
cities) as evidence that its programs have been effective in promoting 
circulation of data and best practices across cities.94 
Based on responses to survey questions, C40 Cities and its 
publication partners recently released “In Focus” reports on ten 
individual cities, nine of which are C40 members, which highlighted 
their accomplishments in increasing energy efficiency and addressing 
climate change.95  New York City’s documented efforts to respond to 
Superstorm Sandy’s devastation and to plan for future extreme 
weather episodes are featured in one of the ten reports.96  Included in 
the report are data on high-level physical risks the City faces as a 
result of increases in the rate of sea-level rise, storm surges, hot days, 
and average annual rainfall, coupled with the vulnerability occasioned 
by older infrastructure.97 
Since its inception, C40 Cities has held biennial mayors’ summits, 
most recently in the city of Johannesburg, South Africa, where the 
gathering became the occasion for interchange with the international 
community’s climate-change programs.  In Johannesburg, a 
substantial group of C40 mayors asked that the United Nations’ Open 
Working Group on Sustainable Development goals include a specific 
goal for urban areas.  The Executive Secretary for the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change attended the summit and 
solicited the involvement of cities in the development of national-
                                                                                                                 
 93. See Networks: Connecting Cities on Topics of Common Interest, supra note 
79. 
 94. See ARUP & C40 CITIES, supra note 84, at 5–6.  For example, survey data 
show that fifty-seven percent of C40 cities that currently have, or plan to implement, 
bus rapid transit systems are located in the global north. Id. 
 95. See C40 Cities, Research Spotlight: New Publications Highlight 10 Cities 
Delivering Best in Class Climate Action Reporting, C40 BLOG (June 4, 2014), 
http://c40.org/blog_posts/research-spotlight-new-publications-highlight-10-cities-
delivering-best-in-class-climate-action-reporting. 
 96. See generally CDP, Data Provided for the CDP CITIES 2013 REPORT: NEW 
YORK CITY (2013), available at http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/
other_uploads/images/82_CDP_2013_New_York_small.original.pdf?1401861985.  
This report covers the city’s governance, risks and adaptations, opportunities created 
by climate change, greenhouse gas emissions at the governmental and community 
levels, and strategy. Id. at 3. 
 97. See id. at 10–12. 
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level climate-change programs.98  C40 mayors rotate on the Steering 
Committee, its governance arm;99 overall leadership is provided by an 
elected Chair, a position that is held for a three-year period.100  The 
C40 Cities Board of Directors reviews and guides the day-to-day 
management of the organization.101 
B. Rockefeller Foundation Initiatives: Promoting Multi-Sectoral 
Collaborations 
In the broader effort to increase knowledge and capacity about 
climate change, the Rockefeller Foundation has been a leading 
proponent of developing resilient systems and the need for multi-
sectoral collaboration.  In its white paper titled Building Climate 
Change Resilience, the Foundation developed a definition of climate 
change resilience that emphasizes its global relevance for developed 
cities such as New York as well as more transitional urban areas.102  In 
its recently inaugurated 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge, 
the Foundation is funding a $35 million initiative to support member 
cities’ efforts to develop resilience plans.103  To be eligible a city must 
have a population in excess of 50,000 and an established governance 
structure.104 
To date, sixty-seven cities have been chosen in two cohorts to 
participate in the network and will receive technical and financial 
support to develop resilience plans, which the initiative defines as 
“the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses and 
systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See Press Release, C40 Cities, C40 Mayors Summit Demonstrates Why Cities 
are Leading On Global Climate Change (Feb. 5, 2014), available at http://c40-
production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/press_releases/images/54_Summit_all-up_
FINAL_1_5_14_9am.original.pdf?1391599813. 
 99. See Steering Committee, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/steering_committees 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 100. See Chair of the C40, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/leadership (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2014) (noting rotating role of mayors acting as Chair and indicating that 
mayors to date generally have served a three-year term ). 
 101. See Board of Directors, C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/board_of_directors 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 102. ROCKEFELLER FOUND., BUILDING CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE (2009), 
available at http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/uploads/files/c9725eb2-b76e-42eb-
82db-c5672a43a097-climate.pdf.  
 103. See Matt Chaban, Rockefeller Foundation Target: 100 Resilient Cities, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (May 14, 2013), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20130514/
REAL_ESTATE/130519952/rockefeller-foundation-target-100-resilient-cities. 
 104. See Katie Watkins, The Rockefeller Foundation Kicks Off Its 100 Resilient 
Cities Challenge, ARCHDAILY (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.archdaily.com/541742/the-
rockefeller-foundation-kicks-off-its-2014-resilient-cities-challenge/. 
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of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.”105  Support 
includes financing for cities to employ a Chief Resilience Officer and 
to disseminate research and best practices.106  The incorporation of 
“stresses” in the definition of resilience contemplates that conditions 
that impair a city’s day–to-day functioning—such as high 
unemployment, inadequate public transportation, food and water 
insecurity, and pervasive violence—also threaten resilience and must 
be addressed.107  The initiative identifies resilience’s key attributes: 
constant learning, rapid rebound, “safe” failure, flexibility, and spare 
capacity.108 
Citing the rationale for setting this challenge, Foundation President 
Judith Rodin has underscored a critical need for a shared problem 
solving approach: 
But in today’s hyper-connected world, our challenges are 
distinguished by their frequency, scale, and ability to ripple over 
borders and across continents.  Once-in-a-lifetime storms now 
threaten the Eastern Seaboard of the United States every few years.  
Disasters in urban areas can impact millions of people and shut 
down entire economic systems and supply chains.  And whether they 
are public health threats, contagions in our financial markets, or 
volatile weather events, our challenges are indeed shared challenges, 
and vulnerability in one area often shakes the stability of another.109 
In spearheading this project, the Foundation replicated a process of 
urban exchange and linking that it has fostered in the Asian Cities 
Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN). 
Inaugurated in 2008, ACCCRN links ten medium-sized cities in 
India, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia in an effort to help them 
build resilience to the effects of climate change,110 and to generate 
useful knowledge that these cities can apply and share in designing 
resilience strategies.111  The network draws its funding from the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. City Resilience, 100 RESILIENT CITIES, http://www.100resilientcities.org/
resilience (last visited Aug. 4, 2014); see also About Us, 100 RESILIENT CITIES, 
http://www.100resilientcities.org/pages/about-us#/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015); 100 
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 106. See Judith Rodin, 100 Resilient Cities, ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Aug. 5, 2013), 
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 107. About Us, supra note 105. 
 108. See generally City Resilience, supra note 105. 
 109. Rodin, supra note 106. 
 110. See Anna Brown, Three Keys for Protecting Mid-Sized Asian Cities, 
ROCKEFELLER FOUND. (Mar. 12, 2014), http://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/blog/
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 111. See generally ABOUT ACCCRN, supra note 8. 
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Rockefeller Foundation and technical, strategic, and logistical input 
from city and regional collaborators, including community-based 
organizations, local government actors, the business sector, and 
disaster relief agencies.112  Its advisory board draws representatives 
from academia, research institutes, civil society, municipal 
government, and international agencies.113 
Similar to C40 Cities, member cities organize international 
workshops, fora, and conferences to promote knowledge on urban 
resilience and adaptation.114  Despite a specific aim to support 
resilience approaches that benefit poor and developing populations, 
the resources that ACCCRN develop relate to challenges affecting 
coastal cities generally, such as public safety, housing design, building 
and infrastructure protection, and public health.115  ACCCRN’s 
participation in international fora highlights the insights that its 
applied research has generated.  For example, at the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations Community 2015 Forum, ACCRRN 
identified three critical components for defending mid-sized cities 
from the triad of climate change, explosive urban growth, and 
vulnerability: access to adequate funding; building capacity in local 
governments acting in conjunction with other partners; and fostering 
cross-sectoral collaboration that includes government, the private 
sector, and funders, and that promotes coordination and sharing of 
information.116 
C. Resilient Cities 
The Rockefeller Foundation is also a partner supporting Resilient 
Cities, which brings together local government leaders and climate 
adaptation specialists to discuss adaptation issues in an urban context 
around the globe on such topics as urban risk, resilient urban logistics, 
financing the resilient city, urban agriculture, smart infrastructure, 
and others.117  This forum is a focal point of the work of the World 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See ACCCRN Partners, ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/about-acccrn/
acccrn-partners (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 113. See Advisory Board, ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/about-acccrn/advisory-
board (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 114. See generally ACCCRN, http://www.acccrn.org/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 115. See, e.g., ACCCRN Newsletter August 2013, ACCCRN, http://us6.campaign-
archive2.com/?u=5e61f404aed445cfe1dbb07a9&id=94961de618 (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
 116. See Brown, supra note 110. 
 117. About the Global Forum, supra note 9; Partners, RESILIENT CITIES, 
http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/resilient-cities-hub-site/partners/ (last visited Oct. 8, 
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Mayors Council on Climate Change and the Bonn Declaration of 
Mayors.118  Convening annually in Bonn, Germany, the forum hosts 
workshops, panel discussions, and plenary sessions that typically 
showcase demonstrations and experience sharing from specific cities.  
Consistent with the approach of the other networks discussed in this 
section, the 2014 Forum promoted dissemination of city-generated 
knowledge and experience.119  Sessions featured GIS-based120 data 
analysis from Wuppertal, Germany, and Rotterdam, Netherlands, and 
green infrastructure developments in the United States and Japan; 
case studies from Bangladesh and South Africa on use of locally-
determined funding; and an ecosystem–based adaptation with 
examples from London, Singapore, and Copenhagen.  Although its 
own governance structure seems looser than that of C40 Cities or 
ACCCRN, the Resilience Cities Congress annually holds the Mayors 
Adaptation Forum, considered the leadership component of the 
program that brings together heads of local government with 
technical support and collaborators.121  Each year the Forum 
culminates in the Bonn Declaration of Mayors, a hortatory document 
highlighting developments and prospective action to promote 
resilience and sustainable development.122 
Resilient Cities identifies supporting partners, sponsors (funders), 
media partners, and, in addition, thirty-eight endorsing partners 
comprising nine United Nations organizations, two German federal 
ministries, other German and European organizations, development 
institutes, scientific and research-oriented bodies, a planning 
association, and environmental and conservation agencies.123  Two of 
the endorsing partners are themselves associated with urban and 
regional governance: the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 
                                                                                                                 
 118. About the Global Forum, supra note 9; Partners, supra note 117. 
 119. See 5th Global Forum on Urban Resilience and Adaptation, RESILIENT 
CITIES 2014, http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/index.php?id=773 (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
 120. GIS refers to a geographic or geospatial information system, a computer 
system for gathering and displaying data, drawn from such sources as satellites and 
maps related to land use and location. GIS (Geographic Information System), NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC EDUC., http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/
encyclopedia/geographic-information-system-gis/?ar_a=1 (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
 121. Mayors Adaptation Forum at Resilient Cities, RESILIENT CITIES, 
http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/index.php?id=833 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 122. Id.; see, e.g., 2013 Bonn Declaration of Mayors, ICLEI, http://www.iclei.org/
fileadmin/user_upload/ICLEI_WS/Images/events/Suwon2013/Resilient_Cities_2013/
MAF2013_Bonn_Declaration_of_Mayors_Draft_20130602.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 
2014). 
 123. Endorsing Partners, RESILIENT CITIES, http://resilient-cities.iclei.org/resilient-
cities-hub-site/partners/endorsing-partners/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
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of the Council of Europe, a political body dedicated to enhancing 
local and regional democracy and governance in Europe,124 and the 
Network for Regional Governments for Sustainable Development 
(nrg4SD), an international group of subnational governments that 
highlights the role of these governments in fostering sustainable 
development and promotes the formulation of subnational-level 
territorial policies.125 
That the inhabitants, institutions, and infrastructure of local 
governments face the most direct threats from extreme weather 
events underscores that local actors are highly knowledgeable about 
the local conditions, resources, and vulnerabilities that must be 
considered in developing appropriate responses.  The networks and 
organized fora discussed in this Part support cities in producing 
information—which they use to create, disseminate, and encourage a 
shared commitment to—norms, metrics, and practices outside of the 
vertical governance structures in which local governments typically 
occupy a subordinate position.  Part III will examine in more detail 
the theory and governance implications of these networks, which 
offer the possibility of an alternative approach for addressing 
transnational climate–related problems.  This approach is based on a 
decentered126 and, more specifically, a polycentric127 modality in place 
of conventional, centralized command-and-control mechanisms.  In 
these networks, legitimacy and efficacy must be gauged with 
reference to more flexible processes that involve comparison and 
sharing among multiple approaches and participants,128 and that 
ultimately seek to build consensus.129 
III.  HORIZONTAL URBAN GOVERNANCE: TRANSNATIONAL 
NETWORKS AS A COMPARATIVE GOVERNANCE SCHEME 
The burgeoning scholarship of governance often obscures the 
concept’s plural meanings—encompassing both government bodies 
and more informal arrangements, private as well as public forms of 
                                                                                                                 
 124. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, the Guarantor of Local and 
Regional Democracy in Europe, CONGRESS LOC. & REGIONAL AUTHORITIES, 
http://www.coe.int/t/congress/presentation/default_en.asp?mytabsmenu=1 (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 125. Missions and Objectives, NETWORK REGIONAL GOV’T FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., http://www.nrg4sd.org/missions-and-objectives (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 126. Harpur, supra note 5, at 50; Lobel, supra note 10, at 381–85. 
 127. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
 128. Stewart, supra note 5, at 447–50, 451–52 (describing network-based systems in 
use in the United States and the European Union). 
 129. Trubek, supra note 5, at 149–50. 
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management.130  If governance is understood at a base level as 
“organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social 
system,”131 certainly the emergence of polycentric institutional 
arrangements of state and non-state actors engaged in collaborative 
problem solving, typically through mobilizing (collecting, reporting, 
and disseminating) information, actualizes the governance-by-
network metaphor.132 
As a cross-disciplinary concept,133 the network can be analyzed 
through the lens of geography in addition to its sociological, political 
theory, and legal regulatory dimensions.  In the context of urban 
locational policies in Western Europe, sociologist Neil Brenner has 
analyzed cooperative interurban networks to illustrate the ostensible 
advantages and limitations of “rescaling outward.”134  Although 
Brenner’s analysis has a distinct context and purpose, identifying 
features in interurban networks that reinforce competition and 
uneven development under capitalism,135 the horizontal, city-to-city 
orientation that such networks entail is useful for this discussion.  The 
network concept offers an alternative way to understand urban 
governance spatially and provides a basis for comparison across urban 
approaches.  In the language of geography, these networks constitute 
“horizontal interlinkages among geographically dispersed nodal 
points”; the “nodal connectivity” of networks replaces the “territorial 
enclosure” of political units whose jurisdiction is defined by bounded 
territory.136  These networks are envisioned as “leapfrogging” over 
space,137 disrupting the idea that a city is limited by its political 
territoriality. 
Brenner refers to these networks in the Western European context 
as “new state spaces,” but in a number of respects they appear as 
latter-day variants of a centuries-old practice from an era before the 
development of the nation state: their historical antecedents are 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the 
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 
472 (2004). 
 131. Burris et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
 132. Id. at 4–5; Stewart, supra note 5, at 450, 452. 
 133. See generally Burris et al., supra note 5, at 12–44 (discussing wide-ranging 
scholarship of networks). 
 134. See BRENNER, supra note 3, at 286–94. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 292–93. 
 137. Id. at 292 (quoting Helga Leitner et al., Networks, Governance, and the 
Politics of Scale: Inter-Urban Networks and the European Union, in GEOGRAPHIES 
OF POWER: PLACING SCALE 207 (Andrew Herod & Melissa W. Wright eds., 2002)). 
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traceable to the medieval period, when merchants and then cities in 
Northern Europe formed networks known as the Hanseatic League, a 
mercantile and security-promoting alliance.138  Recent scholarly 
analysis of the League using network theory emphasizes 
characteristics of networks—“a horizontal, little formalized and 
constantly changing structure . . .  [that] develops around one or more 
hubs or nodes”139—that are distinguishable from both hierarchical 
organizations and a market structure.140  Reflecting this distinctive 
structure, the networks of Hanse merchants and cities were 
heterarchical—interlinked with nodes of varying densities—and at 
both a local and transnational level.141 
Further, as the Hanseatic trading networks expanded and gained 
influence, the networks generated norms and rules that ensured 
stability and a reliable basis for cooperation by setting criteria of 
merchantable quality and measurement, permitting debt claims, and 
recognizing individual liability.142  The network structure anchored in 
the trading offices that enforced these rules also served important 
coordinating and information-exchange functions.143 
Network theory and the historical example of the Hanseatic 
networks provide a conceptual model and a point of comparison for 
transnational networks formed to promote sustainable urbanism and 
initiatives to address climate change.  In the context of climate-change 
mitigation and adaptation strategies, various United Nations 
institutions, in particular UN-Habitat for a Better Urban Future144 
and the newly established Special Envoy for Climate Change and 
Cities,145 look to networked cities as crucial actors in amassing 
relevant knowledge, generating standards for action, and serving as 
reference points for similarly situated cities. 
Executive Director of UN-Habitat Joan Clos made this point at the 
close of a three-day conference hosted by the United Nations 
                                                                                                                 
 138. See, e.g., id. at 293 n.7; BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE 
METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION: HOW CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN 
POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY 166–68 (2013). See generally Margrit Schulte 
Beerbühl, Networks of the Hanseatic League, EGO: EUR. HIST. ONLINE (Jan. 13, 
2012), http://www.ieg-ego.eu/schultebeerbuehlm-2011-en. 
 139. Beerbühl, supra note 138, at ¶ 2. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 46. 
 142. Id. at ¶ 25. 
 143. Id. at ¶ 28. 
 144. See UN-HABITAT BETTER URB. FUTURE, supra note 69. 
 145. Mayors on Frontline of Battle Against Climate Change—UN, UN NEWS 
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Economic and Social Council, on May 27–29, 2014.  Specifically, Clos 
cited the leading role that mayors have played in efforts to address 
climate change as he announced support for a compact that various 
networks, comprising thousands of cities, would sign to pledge 
support for adopting climate-change resilience strategies.146  At the 
same conference, United Nations Special Envoy for Cities and 
Climate Change Michael Bloomberg opined that mayors’ executive 
powers positioned them to move forward on climate-change efforts, 
and that they “did not have to wait for Government actions.”147  
Presumably the Special Envoy referred to state, regional, or national 
government regulatory action under a vertical governance model, 
although in actuality the extent of mayoral powers across cities, and 
the form of policymaking authority that can be exercised on behalf of 
cities under that model, vary.148 
Reflecting the direct stake that cities have in addressing climate 
risk, the networks invoked with approval under these United Nations 
                                                                                                                 
 146. Id. 
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policymaking authority. See Fine & Caras, supra, at 127.  As a recent example, the 
New York Court of Appeals held that the New York City Board of Health’s 
adoption of a rule limiting the portion size of sugary beverages provided in food 
service establishments constituted an exercise of lawmaking and infringed on the 
legislative powers of the City Council. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of 
Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 134 (N.Y. 2014), 
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Decisions/2014/Jun14/134opn14-
Decision.pdf. 
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auspices operate horizontally in contrast to vertical governance 
schemes to promote “policy diffusion.”  This governance concept 
refers generally to the horizontal dispersion and adoption by other 
government units of an idea or policy, typically through processes that 
include gaining exposure to policy innovation, monitoring its 
progress, and justifying adoption of a similar policy on the basis of its 
demonstrated success and appropriateness.149  An example of policy 
diffusion in the interurban climate-change context, as mentioned 
above, is the recent spread of bus rapid transit programs, a policy 
originating in South America and then adopted in more developed 
northern cities.150 
Judith Resnik’s work on translocal organizations of government 
actors151 suggests productive analogies to the horizontal interurban 
relationships discussed here.  Resnik’s analysis notes the potential for 
the organizations she describes, for example the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors, to “create norms for office holders and shape policy 
preferences,” to “model behavior as [translocal actors] cooperate and 
pool resources,” and to serve as “conduits for border crossings- state 
to state, state to federal, and international.”152  The transnational 
climate-change networks similarly operate by creating norms, shaping 
policy, modeling behavior, and facilitating broader dissemination and 
adoption of policy related to adapting to climate risks.153 
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Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1132 (2008). 
 153. See Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 
57 EMORY L.J. 31, 50–63 (2007) (citing examples in which U.S. cities adopted 
measures or asserted policy positions supporting international norms embodied in 
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
118 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
Interurban initiatives such as C40 Cities and Resilient Cities 
recognize the central role that cities play both as contributors to 
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus global warming, and as loci of 
innovation, experimentation, and creativity.154  These transnational, 
interurban networks facilitate coordination and communication 
among cities and help them assemble critical financial and technical 
support, essential in light of the fiscally dependent conditions in which 
cities in vertical governance structures operate.155  Further, the 
networks help develop cities’ capacity to disseminate knowledge and 
methodologies, ideas, policy innovation, expertise, and resources, and 
shape policy and problem solving on critical climate-resilience issues.  
Although not a condition of network membership, a desirable 
outcome for the networks is to bring about collective action among 
participating cities to adopt or commit to shared norms and 
practices.156 
In short, resembling the interconnected Hanseatic League trading 
networks and the overlapping network of cities that supported 
them,157 the transnational interurban networks discussed in Part II 
seek to develop norms, standards, and best practices, such as 
measuring and reporting climate-change effects that, in turn, serve as 
a continuing point of reference and comparison for other cities 
participating in the networks.  To the extent that member cities 
consent to be bound by these developing climate-change resilience 
standards (and assuming they are not precluded from doing so by 
domestic law), the networks offer a framework for problem solving-
oriented governance158 that is horizontal rather than vertical, 
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heterarchical/nodal rather than hierarchical, and comparative in 
operation. 
IV.  ADDRESSING POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS 
Before concluding, this Part surfaces and responds to potential 
limitations upon this governance approach.  These include the impact 
of a pro-growth orientation prevalent in cities on the adoption of 
climate-resilient strategies and the possibility that variable conditions 
among horizontally-linked cities may not be replicable in other 
contexts or serviceable to a horizontal governance model.  Further, 
this Part addresses concerns that well-resourced non-state 
participants will dwarf the role of local government actors and, 
perhaps, reinforce dynamics of dependency among cities in less 
developed regions. 
Scholars and commentators of urban government and policy have 
long associated cities with a pro-growth ideology that elevates 
business and developer preferences and initiatives over those 
motivated by efforts to overcome resource inequality or that 
otherwise limit the conditions under which growth that is subject to a 
minimum of restraints can occur.159  The tension between pro-growth 
and alternative preferences is particularly pronounced as cities turn to 
resilience strategies to address climate change.  For coastal cities such 
as New York, waterfront development is typically tied to economic 
well-being and is widely regarded as desirable.160  However, given 
projections of continuing sea-level rise and increased risk of surges, 
unrestrained waterfront development can pose significant costs and 
risks.161 
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Developing the waterfront requires construction or extension of 
infrastructure and, in turn, necessitates structural (hard) armoring 
strategies162 to protect against storm surges and other weather-related 
damage.  Resorting to such measures is costly, requiring investment in 
maintenance or replacement of these armoring structures.163  These 
weather-related costs supply an economic rationale for reassessing 
the growth orientation of coastal cities.  As a further economic 
consideration, cities seeking to balance growth and strategies of 
climate resilience could offer or increase financial incentives to 
promote “green” rather than waterfront development.  The mutually 
reinforcing effect of large numbers of cities linked in a network 
committed to policies promoting sustainability and resilience could 
potentially moderate the force of the growth imperative. 
To address the concern that variations in the cities’ climate, 
geography, and economy may preclude useful comparisons, networks 
can be formed in ways that emphasize commonalities among member 
cities.  For example, organizing cities in terms of size, geographic 
characteristics, extent of development and economic wherewithal, or 
in terms of more specific policy concerns or subissues164 within the 
broader ambit of climate change, can achieve more nuanced linkages 
among similarly situated cities.  Examples include C40 Cities, the 
members of which are linked by their megacity status,165 and the 
ACCCRN, in which member cities are linked by geography, medium 
size, and the objective to support resilience measures for developing 
populations.166 
The potential problem that influential non-state actors will 
dominate these networks167 points to a concern that networks lack 
legal accountability.168  Particularly in light of the prominent role that 
well-resourced foundations and philanthropies already play in 
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promoting these interurban linkages,169 one might question whether 
network cities are in fact driving and diffusing innovation.  Further, 
that network methods replicate practices and rhetoric favored by the 
private sector, including aggregating information, reliance on 
feedback, and use of yardsticks and targets,170 further demonstrates 
the ways in which governance has modulated the traditional role and 
practices of government.171  These considerations are not easily 
dismissed.  However, the central role of consortia of local 
governments in these networks, including the C40 Cities mayors, 
ICLEI, the World Mayors Council on Climate Change, and the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of 
Europe, suggests that participation in the networks will likely 
strengthen local governments’ capacity, voice, and access to 
information on climate-related issues. 
An additional point to recognize is that networked cities’ authority 
to adopt norms horizontally/heterarchically is subject to the 
requirements of the hierarchical governance structure under which 
each city also operates.  These include the extent of a city’s home rule 
power, noted in Part I, which is tied to the nature of the policy or 
practice involved.  Certainly in New York, to the extent that local 
climate-change initiatives are considered regulation of land use, such 
local action should in the first instance fall within the ambit of home 
rule authority;172 the possibility that a preemption challenge would 
succeed, however, is less predictable.  Even under circumstances in 
which a network-member city’s climate-change initiative were 
deemed preempted by state or federal law, the city’s proactive testing 
of policies and practices would have value: such local action 
contributes to the body of knowledge and experience available to 
other cities in the network.  In addition, it provides a blueprint for, 
and exerts upward pressure upon, higher levels of government in a 
vertical governance scheme to move forward on useful climate-
change initiatives. 
CONCLUSION 
A turn to transnational urban networks to generate and diffuse 
climate-related norms and practices is an approach warranting further 
consideration.  Although the concerns identified in Part IV merit 
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attention, the interurban network model does hold the potential to 
expand participating cities’ resources and knowledge opportunities.  
It increases cities’ capacity to address an issue that is simultaneously 
local and global, that calls for intergovernmental and multi-sectoral 
collaboration, and that has generally confounded efforts to achieve a 
workable consensus at the national scale. 
A problem-solving and policy-making approach that is attentive to 
an individual city’s experience and scale while drawing on the shared 
experience of multiple network-linked cities increases the potential 
benefits of the individual city’s membership.  As it moves forward 
with climate-resilience initiatives, a city such as New York that 
participates in transnational interurban networks can both draw from 
and contribute to the knowledge and experience generated by other 
cities in its cohort.  This accumulated knowledge and practice can 
form the basis for an alternative modality of loose or soft governance, 
a framework of norms, standards, and metrics to which cities can 
agree to be bound. 
The use of urban networks is not a new idea or scalar arrangement, 
but it alters the tendency to overemphasize vertical governance 
schemes and the scale of national government.  Climate-oriented 
urban networks may have more initial success than other levels of 
government in promoting the diffusion of guiding norms, policies, and 
problem-solving practices because they foreground cities’ preeminent 
knowledge of local conditions and harness their practical incentives to 
develop resilient approaches.  By proliferating information and 
promoting comparison at the urban level, transnational urban 
networks may reinvigorate efforts to build and scale up a broader 
intergovernmental climate-change adaptation and resilience 
consensus. 
 
